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1 Abstract
In many stochastic games stemming from financial models, the environment
evolves with latent factors and there may be common noise across agents’ states.
Two classic examples are: (i) multi-agent trading on electronic exchanges, and (ii)
systemic risk induced through inter-bank lending/borrowing. Moreover, agents’
actions often affect the environment, and some agent’s may be small while others
large. Hence sub-population of agents may act as minor agents, while another
class may act as major agents. To capture the essence of such problems, here,
we introduce a general class of non-cooperative heterogeneous stochastic games
with one major agent and a large population of minor agents where agents interact
with an observed common process impacted by the mean field. A latent Markov
chain and a latent Wiener process (common noise) modulate the common process,
and agents cannot observe them. We use filtering techniques coupled with a
convex analysis approach to (i) solve the mean field game limit of the problem, (ii)
demonstrate that the best response strategies generate an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for
finite populations, and (iii) obtain explicit characterisations of the best response
strategies.
2 Introduction
Mean Field Game (MFG) systems theory establishes the existence of approximate
Nash equilibria and the corresponding individual strategies for stochastic
dynamical systems in games involving a large number of agents [1–3]. The
equilibria are termed ǫ-Nash equilibria and are generated by the local, limited
information feedback control actions of each agent in the population. The
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feedback control actions constitute the best response of each agent with respect to
the behaviour of the mass of agents. Moreover, the approximation error, induced
by using the MFG solution, converges to zero as the population size tends to
infinity. The analysis of this set of problems originated in [2, 4–6] (see [7],
[1]), and independently in [8–10]. In [11] and [12] the authors analyse and
solve the linear quadratic systems case where there is a major agent (whose
impact does not vanish in the limit of infinite population size) together with a
population of minor agents (where each agent has individually asymptotically
negligible effect). Major-minor problems lead to stochastic mean fields; and by
extending the state space for such systems, [12] and [13] establish the existence of
ǫ-Nash equilibria together with the individual agents’ control laws that yield the
equilibria. Following this work, the partially observed MFG theory for nonlinear
and linear quadratic systems with major and minor agents is developed in [14–20]
where the agents’ states are partially obfuscated by Brownian noise.
The MFG approach has been applied recently in a number of financial
modeling problems. Here we highlight a few important contributions. An optimal
execution problem in algorithmic trading with the linear models in [21] was
formulated as for the nonlinear major-minor (MM) MFG model in [22]. The
completely observed and partially observed major minor linear quadratic MFG
theory was first applied to an optimal execution problem with linear models
(see e.g., [21]) in [23], and subsequently in [24–26]. Optimal stopping and
switching time problems are addressed for competitive market participants in
[27]. A mean field game of controls is applied to optimal trading problems in
[28, 29]. Financial markets driven by latent factors are modeled in the MFG
framework in [30, 31]. The problem of optimal portfolio liquidation using MFG
formulation was addressed in [32]. [33] investigates investment decisions in the
electricity market using linear-quadratic McKean-Vlasov control problems with
random coefficients.
Problem description: In this paper, an MFG framework is considered where
there exist one major agent and a large number of minor agents which are subject
to linear dynamics and quadratic cost functionals. Each agent interacts with other
agents in the system through the coupling in their cost functional with a common
process. The common process is modulated by a latent (unobservable) Markov
process, the major agent’s state, the major agent’s control action, the average state
of all minor agents, the average control action of all minor agents, and a common
Wiener process. The objective is to characterize the best response strategies which
yield an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Motivation: Financial and economic systems (among others) are often driven
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by latent factors, and these latent factors also affect the cost (profit) functional
of the traders involved. Moreover, the agents in these system are often acting
in a non-cooperative manner, and hence playing a large stochastic game with
one another; while they may control aspects of the system, they are also at
the whim of factors they cannot control or observe. For example, in optimal
execution problems (where traders aim to sell or buy shares of an asset), all
traders are subject to the same asset price process and must make their trading
decisions based on the observed price. The asset price dynamics may be driven
by a common Wiener process, which accounts for so-called noise traders who
are considered non-sophisticated and uninformed about future price movements.
In addition, the effect of unobserved latent factors, other than the major agent’s
trading action and the aggregate impact of minor agents’ trading actions, are
important to incorporate (see e.g. [34], [30] ) in specifying the best response
trading strategies and resulting ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Methodology: Although latent processes are not directly observable, the
information provided from the realized trajectories of the common process and the
evolution of system’s aggregate state (mean field) can be used to obtain posteriori
estimates, and to subsequently partially predict future behavior of the common
process [34]. Certain versions of such problems can then be recast as MFG
systems with a common noise. A variation of this type of MFG system has been
investigated in [35], where the case of correlated randomness in a nonlinear setting
is analyzed. Here we utilize a different approach in order to address the existence
of a latent process together with the common noise. Specifically, we treat the
common process as a major agent and further extend the Major-Minor LQGMFG
analysis of [11] to incorporate a latent process in the dynamics. Moreover, we
develop a novel convex analysis approach to obtain the best response strategies
for all agents that yield an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. We presented the initial results of
this work in [36].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 introduces a class of
major-minor MFG problems with a common process as well as a latent process.
The MFG formulation of the problem is then presented in Section 4. Concluding
remarks are made in Section 5.
3
3 Major-Minor Mean Field Game Systems with a
Common Process
3.1 Dynamics: Finite Population
We consider a large population of N minor agents and a major agent, where
the agents are coupled through their individual cost functionals with a common
process.
3.1.1 Major and Minor agents
The underlying dynamics of the major and minor agents are assumed to be given,
respectively, by
dx0t = [A0x
0
t +B0u
0
t + b0(t)]dt+ σ0dw
0
t , (1)
dxit = [Akx
i
t +Bku
i
t + bk(t)]dt+ σkdw
i
t, (2)
where t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ N := {1, . . . , N}, N < ∞, and the subscript
k ∈ K := {1, . . . , K}, K ≤ N , denotes the type of a minor agent. Here,
xit ∈ R
n, i ∈ N0 := N ∪ {0}, are the states, u
i
t ∈ R
m, i ∈ N0 are the
control inputs, {wit, i ∈ N0} denotes (N + 1) independent standard Wiener
processes inRr, wherewi is progressively measurable with respect to the filtration
Fw := (Fwt )t∈[0,T ]. All matrices in (1) and (2) are constant and of appropriate
dimension; vectors b0(t), and bk(t) are deterministic functions of time.
Assumption 1. The initial states {xi0, i ∈ N0} are identically distributed and
mutually independent and also independent of Fw; E[wit(w
i
t)
T ] = Σ. Moreover,
Exi0 = 0, and E‖x
i
0‖
2 ≤ C <∞, with Σ and C independent ofN , for all i ∈ N0.
Minor Agents Types:
Minor agents are given inK distinct types with 1 ≤ K <∞. The notation
Ψk , Ψ(θi), θi = k
is introduced where θi ∈ Θ, with Θ being the parameter set, and Ψ may be any
dynamical parameter in (2) or weight matrix in the cost functional (6). The symbol
Ik denotes
Ik = {i : θi = k, i ∈ N}, k ∈ K
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where the cardinality of Ik is denoted by Nk = |Ik|. Then, π
N =
(πN1 , ..., π
N
K ), π
N
k =
Nk
N
, k ∈ K, denotes the empirical distribution of the
parameters (θ1, ..., θN ) sampled independently of the initial conditions andWiener
processes of the agents Ai, i ∈ N. The first assumption is as follows.
Assumption 2. There exists π such that limN→∞π
N = π a.s.
3.1.2 Common Process: Finite Population
We consider the systems where the major agent and any minor agent Ai, i ∈ N,
observe a common stochastic process yt, where both the state and common
process yt appear in an agent’s cost functional as will be introduced in Section
3.2. The common process yt ∈ R
n is governed by
dyt = dy
L
t + (Fu
(N)
t dt+ F0u
0
t +Hx
(N)
t +H0x
0
t )dt, (3)
where yLt ∈ R
d evolves as in
dyLt = f(t, y
L
t ,Γt)dt+ σdwt. (4)
In (4), the process Γ := (Γt)t∈[0,T ] denotes a latent continuous Markov chain
process with Γt ∈ {γj, j ∈ M}, M = {1, . . . ,M}, M < ∞; the vector
f(t, yLt ,Γt) denotes a deterministic nonlinear function of t, y
L, and Γ; wt ∈ R
r
denotes a latent Wiener process independent of {wit, i ∈ N0}, and the matrices
F , F0, H , H0, and σ are deterministic, constant and of appropriate dimensions.
Moreover, by substituting (4) in (3), it is evident that the common process yt is
impacted by
1) a latent Markov chain process Γt,
2) the major agent’s state x0t ,
3) the major agent’s control action u0t ,
4) the average state of minor agents, i.e. x
(N)
t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 x
i
t,
5) the average control action of minor agents, i.e. u
(N)
t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 u
i
t,
6) a Wiener process wt ∈ R
r independent of wit, i ∈ N0.
Assumption 3. The major agentA0 completely observes its own state x
0
t , and the
common process yt.
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Assumption 4. Each minor agent Ai, i ∈ N, completely observes its own state
xit, the major agent’s state x
0
t , and the common process yt.
We again emphasize that the latent processes Γt and wt are not directly
observed by the agents Ai, i ∈ N0. However, each agent may obtain their
posteriori estimates based on its complete observations on the common process
yt. We refer to the latent Wiener process as the common noise process in this
work.
3.1.3 Control σ-Fields
For any finite T , We denote (i) the natural filtration generated by the i-th minor
agent’s state (xit)t∈[0,T ] by F
i := (F it )t∈[0,T ], i ∈ N, (ii) the natural filtration
generated by the major agent’s state (x0t )t∈[0,T ] by F
0 := (F0t )t∈[0,T ] , (iii) the
natural filtration generated by the states of all agents ((xit)i∈N0)t∈[0,T ] by F :=
(Ft)t∈[0,T ], (iv) the natural filtration generated by (Γt, wt)t∈[0,T ] by G := (Gt)t∈[0,T ]
, and (v) the natural filtration generated by (yt)t∈[0,T ] by F
y := (Fyt )t∈[0,T ].
Next, we introduce three admissible control sets. First, U0 denotes the set
of feedback control laws adapted to the filtration F0,r := (F0,rt )t∈[0,T ], where
F0,r := F0 ∨ Fy, such that E[
∫ T
0
u
0⊺
t ut dt] < ∞. Second, U
i, i ∈ N, denotes
the set of control laws adapted to the filtration F i,r := (F i,rt )t∈[0,T ], where
F i,r := F i ∨ F0 ∨ Fy, i ∈ N, such that E[
∫ T
0
u
i⊺
t u
i
t dt] < ∞. Third, U
N
g is
adapted to the general filtration F g := (F gt )t∈[0,T ], where F
g := F ∨Fy ∨G, such
that E[
∫ T
0
u
⊺
tut dt] <∞.
Assumption 5 (Major Agent’s Linear Control Laws). For major agent A0, the
set of control laws U0,L ∈ U0, is defined to be the collection of linear feedback
control laws adapted to F0,r.
Assumption 6 (Minor Agent’s Linear Control Laws). For each minor agent
Ai, i ∈ N, the set of control laws U
i,L ∈ U i, i ∈ N, is defined to be the collection
of linear feedback control laws adapted to F i,r, i ∈ N.
3.2 Cost Functionals: Finite Population
Given the vector z0t as
z0t =
[
y
⊺
t , x
0⊺
t
]⊺
.
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the major agent’s cost functional to be minimized is formulated by
J0(u
0, u−0) = 1
2
E
[
z
0⊺
T G0z
0
T +
∫ T
0
{
z0⊺s Q0z
0
s + 2 z
0⊺
s N0u
0
s + u
0⊺
s R0u
0
s
}
ds
]
, (5)
where u−0 = (u1, u2, ..., uN).
Assumption 7. G0,Q0, andR0 are symmetric matrices of appropriate dimension,
and we have G0 ≥ 0, Q0 − N0R
−1
0 N
⊺
0 ≥ 0, and R0 > δI for some δ > 0 (see
[37]).
Similarly, to define the minor agents’ cost functional, let the vector zit, i ∈ N,
denote1
zit =
[
x
i⊺
t , y
⊺
t
]⊺
.
Then, minor agent Ai, i ∈ N, of type k ∈ K, cost functional to be minimized is
Ji(u
i, u−i) = 1
2
E
[
z
i⊺
T Gkz
i
T +
∫ T
0
{
zi⊺s Qkz
i
s + 2z
i⊺
s Nku
i
s + u
i⊺
s Rku
i
s
}
ds
]
, (6)
k ∈ K, where u−i = (u0, ..., ui−1, ui+1, ..., uN).
Assumption 8. Gk,Qk, andRk are symmetric matrices of appropriate dimension,
and we have Gk ≥ 0, Qk − NkR
−1
k N
⊺
k ≥ 0, and Rk > δI for some δ > 0 and
∀k ∈ K (see [37]).
4 Major-Minor LQGMean Field Games Approach
In the mean field game methodology with a major agent [13], [11], the problem
is first solved in the infinite population case where the average terms in the finite
population dynamics and cost functional of each agent are replaced with their
infinite population limit, i.e. the mean field. For this purpose, the major agent’s
state is extended with the mean field, while the minor agent’s state is extended
with the major agent’s state, and the mean field; this yields stochastic optimal
control problems for each agent linked only through the major agent’s state and
1For the minor agent, in zi
t
we order yt second, while for the major agent in z
0
t
we order yt
first. This is done for convenience when we extend the minor agents’ state in Section 4.4.
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mean field. Finally the infinite population best response strategies are applied to
the finite population system which yields an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
To address major-minor mean field game systems involving a common process
which, in turn, is impacted by a latent Markov chain process, the following steps
are followed. We first note that the common process in this work represents an
extended form of common noise in [35]. However, here, we follow a different
approach to incorporate the common process in the major-minor LQG mean field
game framework. First, in Section 4.1, the evolution of the state mean field
and the control mean field in the infinite population case are derived. Then, an
F0,r-adapted and F i,r-adapted, i ∈ N, projections of the common process in the
infinite population case are presented in Section 4.2. Next in Sections 4.3 and
4.4, the common process is perceived as a major agent in the major-minor LQG
MFG framework. Subsequently, the major-minor LQG analysis described above
is further extended where the major agent’s state is extended with the mean field
and the F0,r-adapted common process, while a minor agent’s state is extended
with the major agent’s state, the mean field, and theF i,r-adapted common process.
Finally, a convex analysis approach is taken in Section 4.5 to obtain the best
response strategies which yield the infinite population Nash equilibrium and finite
population ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
4.1 Mean Field Evolution
The common process yt governed by (3) appears in the empirical average of the
minor agents’ states, i.e. x
(N)
t , as well as the empirical average of the minor
agents’ control actions, i.e. u
(N)
t . Hence, to attain the infinite population limit y¯t
of yt, we introduce the state mean field x¯t and the control mean field u¯t as the
infinite population limits of x
(N)
t and u
(N)
t , respectively.
4.1.1 Control Mean Field
The empirical average of minor agents’ control actions is defined as
u
(Nk)
t =
1
Nk
Nk∑
j=1
u
j,k
t , k ∈ K, (7)
and we define the vector u
(N)
t := [u
(N1)
t , u
(N2)
t , ..., u
(NK)
t ], where the limit (in
quadratic mean) of u
(N)
t , if it exists, is called the control mean field of the system
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and is denoted by u¯t = [u¯
1
t , ..., u¯
K
t ]. For each minor agent Ai, i ∈ N, of type
k ∈ K, we consider a state feedback control ui,kt ∈ U
i,L of the form
u
i,k
t = L
k
1x
i,k
t +
K∑
l=1
Nl∑
j=1
L
k,l
2 x
j,l
t + L
k
3x
0
t + L
k
4yt +m
k
t , (8)
where t ∈ [0, T ], Lk1 , L
k,l
2 , L
k
3 and L
k
4 are constant matrices of appropriate
dimensions, and mkt is a F
y
t -measurable process. Coefficients in (8) depend only
on agent type and not the individual agent. If we take the average of the control
actions u
i,k
t over the population of the agents of type k ∈ K, and hence calculate
u
(N)
t , it can be shown that the limit u¯t of u
(N)
t as N → ∞, i.e. the control mean
field is given by
u¯t = C¯x¯t + D¯x
0
t + E¯y¯t + r¯t, (9)
where x¯t, if it exists, denotes the state mean field introduced in Section 4.1.2, y¯t
denotes the limiting process associated with the common process yt as N → ∞
(see Section 4.2), and r¯t is a F
y
t -measurable process. Furthermore, the matrices
in (9), i.e.
C¯ =
 C¯1...
C¯K
 , D¯ =
 D¯1...
D¯K
 , E¯ =
 E¯1...
E¯K
 , r¯t =
 r¯
1
t
...
r¯Kt
 , (10)
are to be solved for using the mean field consistency equations (68)-(69) derived
in Section 4.5.
4.1.2 State Mean Field
Similarly, the empirical state average is defined as
x
(Nk)
t =
1
Nk
Nk∑
j=1
x
j,k
t , k ∈ K, (11)
where the vector x
(N)
t := [x
(N1)
t , x
(N2)
t , ..., x
(NK)
t ], and the limit (in quadratic mean)
of x
(N)
t , if it exists, is called the state mean field of the system and is denoted by
x¯t = [x¯
1
t , ..., x¯
K
t ].
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If we substitute (8) in (2) for i ∈ N, and take the average of the states of the
minor agents’ closed-loop systems of type k ∈ K, and hence calculate x
(N)
t , it can
be shown that the limit x¯t of x
(N)
t , i.e. the state mean field, satisfies
dx¯t =
(
A¯x¯t + G¯x
0
t + L¯y¯t + m¯t
)
dt, (12)
where y¯t denotes the infinite population limit of the common process yt (see
Section 4.2), m¯t is a F
y
t -measurable process, and the matrices
A¯ =
 A¯1...
A¯K
 , G¯ =
 G¯1...
G¯K
 , L¯ =
 L¯1...
L¯K
 , m¯t =
 m¯
1
t
...
m¯Kt
 , (13)
are again to be solved for using the mean field consistency conditions (68)-(69)
derived in Section 4.5.
With a slight abuse of language, we refer to the mean value of the system’s
mean field, given by the state process x¯t = [x¯
1
t , ..., x¯
K
t ], as the system’s mean
field (the derivation of the state mean field equation above may be performed
using the methods of [16], [14] and [11]).
4.2 Common Process: Infinite Population
Each agent completely observes the common process yt but has no observations
on the latent Markov chain process Γt. In order to resolve the issue of the
unobserved latent process Γt, the Wonham filtering method is used to estimate
the distribution of Γt based on the observations of each agent on yt, i.e. F
y
t . As a
result of Assumptions 3-4, the major agent A0, and each minor agent Ai, i ∈ N,
completely observe the unaffected common process yLt given by (3) in the infinite
population limit. Subsequently, f(t, yLt ,Γt) and wt in (4) are presented in their
Fy
L
t -adapted forms (see e.g. [34], [38]).
Denote the transition probabilities for the continuous time Markov chain
process Γ by
pij = P(Γt+h = γj|Γt = γi), i, j ∈M (14)
and the corresponding transition rates by vij ≥ 0, and
vi =
M∑
j=1, j 6=i
vij , i ∈M. (15)
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The posterior distribution of Γt conditional on F
yL
t is denoted by Π = {π
j
t , j ∈
M, t ∈ [0, T ]}, where
π
j
t = E[1{Γt=γj}|F
yL
t ], j ∈M, t ∈ [0, T ], (16)
with initial distribution {πj0, j ∈M}.
Lemma 1 (Wonham Filter). [38] If σ > 0, the posterior distribution Π of Γt
solves the SDE
dπ
j
t =
(
−vjπ
j
t+
M∑
i=1, i 6=j
vijπ
i
t
)
dt−σ−2
( M∑
i=1
πitγi
)[
f(t, yLt , γj)−
M∑
i=1
πitγi
]
π
j
t dt
+ σ−2
[
f(t, yLt , γj)−
M∑
i=1
πitγi
]
π
j
t dy
L
t , (17)
j ∈M.

Lemma 2. [34] Define the process ŵ = (ŵt)t∈[0,T ] as
ŵt = wt + σ
−1
∫ t
0
(fτ − f̂τ )dτ, (18)
where f̂ = (f̂t)t∈[0,T ] is the F
y
t -adapted process
f̂t = E[f(t, y
L
t ,Γt)|F
y
t ] =
M∑
j=1
π
j
t f(t, y
L
t , γj). (19)
Then the process ŵ is an Fy-adapted Wiener process.

Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, equation (4) can be rewritten as
dyLt = f̂t dt+ σ dŵt, (20)
and by substituting (20) in (3), the F0,r-adapted dynamics of the common process
for the infinite population case, i.e. y¯t, is given by
dy¯t = [f̂t + F
piu¯t + F0u
0
t +H
pix¯t +H0x
0
t ] dt+ σ dŵt, (21)
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where the average terms x
(N)
t and u
(N)
t in (3) have been replaced with their limits
asN →∞, i.e. the state mean field x¯t and the control mean field u¯t, respectively.
Moreover, F pi = π⊗F andHpi = π⊗H , where⊗ denotes the Kronecker product
of the corresponding matrices.
Remark 1. As the state and the control action of each individual minor agent
Ai, i ∈ N, do not affect the infinite population evolution of the common process,
i.e. y¯t, the F
i,r-adapted and F0,r-adapted projection of the common process y¯t in
the infinite population limit are identical and given by (21).
4.3 Major Agent’s Regulation Problem : Infinite Population
To begin, we extend the major agent’s state x0t with the state mean field x¯t and the
infinite population common process y¯t to form the major agent’s extended state
X0t = [(y¯t)
⊺, (x0t )
⊺, (x¯t)
⊺]⊺ and satisfies the SDE
dX0t = A0X
0
t dt+ B0u
0
tdt+M
0
tdt+ Σ0dW
0
t . (22)
By substituting (9) into (21), the matrices in the extended major agent’s dynamics
(22) are given by
A0 =
 F piE¯ F piD¯ +H0 F piC¯ +Hpi0n×n A0 0n×nK
L¯ G¯ A¯
 , B0 =
 F0B0
0nK×m
 , M0t =
 f̂t + F pir¯tb0(t)
m¯t
 ,
(23)
Σ0 =
 σ 0n×r 0n×rK0n×r σ0 0n×rK
0nK×r 0nK×r 0nK×rK
 , W 0t =
 ŵtw0t
0rK×1
 .
Next, the major agent’s extended cost functional is
Jex0 (u
0) =
1
2
E
[
X
0⊺
T G0X
0
T+
∫ T
0
{
X0⊺s Q0X
0
s+2X
0⊺
s N0u
0
s+u
0⊺
s R0u
0
s
}
ds
]
, (24)
where the corresponding weight matrices are given by
G0 = [I2n, 02n×nK ]
⊺
G0 [I2n, 02n×nK] , (25)
Q0 = [I2n, 02n×nK]
⊺
Q0 [I2n, 02n×nK] , (26)
N0 =
[
N0
0nK×m
]
. (27)
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The minimization of the extended cost functional (24) subject to the extended
dynamics (22) constitutes a stochastic optimal control problem for the major agent
in the infinite population limit. Our main result Theorem 3 is proven in Section
4.5, and it implies that the major agent’s optimal control action is given by
u
0,∗
t = −R
−1
0
[
N
⊺
0X
0
t + B
⊺
0
(
Π0(t)X
0
t + s
0
t
)]
, (28)
where Π0(t) is the solution to the ODE
−Π˙0 = Π0A0 + A
⊺
0Π0 − (B
⊺
0Π0 + N
⊺
0)
⊺R−10 (B
⊺
0Π0 + N
⊺
0) +Q0, (29a)
Π0(T ) = G0, (29b)
and s0t is the solution to the FBSDE
ds0t = −
(
[(A0 − B0R
−1
0 N0)
⊺ −Π0B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0]s
0
t +Π0M
0
t
)
dt+ (q0t − Π0Σ0)dW
0
t ,
(30a)
s0T = 0,
(30b)
where M0t is generated through forward propagation and q
0
t is an F
0,r-adapted
process defined under equation (83). The Riccati equation (29) and the offset
equation (30) shall be derived in Section 4.5.
We use the notation
g0t = g
0(t, yLt , s
0
t ) = [(A0 − B0R
−1
0 N0)
⊺ −Π0B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0]s
0
t +Π0M
0
t , (31)
ξ0t = [y
L
t , s
0
t ]
⊺, (32)
A0(t, ξ0) =
[
−H⊺0g
0
H0fˆ
]
(t, yL, s0), (33)
for a fixed (2n+ nK)× n full-rank matrixH0.
Assumption 9 (Measurability Condition). The processes fˆt and g
0
t are,
respectively, Rn-valued and R2n+nK-valued progressively measurable processes
on [0, T ] such that (see [39])
E
[∫ T
0
‖fˆt‖
2 dt
]
<∞, (34)
E
[∫ T
0
‖g0t ‖
2 dt
]
<∞. (35)
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Assumption 10 (Growth Condition). There exists a constant c > 0 such that for
each (t, ω, yL, s0) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω×Rd ×R2n+nK , we have (see [39])
‖fˆ(t, yL)‖ ≤ c(1 + ‖yL‖), (36)
‖g0(t, yL, s0)‖ ≤ c(1 + ‖yL‖+ ‖s0‖). (37)
Assumption 11 (Lipschitz Condition). There exists a constant c > 0 such that
∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀yL, yL
′
∈ Rd, and ∀s0, s0
′
∈ R2n+nK , we have (see [39])
‖fˆ(t, yL)− fˆ(t, yL
′
)‖ ≤ c(1 + ‖yL − yL
′
‖), (38)
‖g0(t, yL, s0)− g0(t, yL
′
, s0
′
)‖ ≤ c(1 + ‖yL − yL
′
‖+ ‖s0 − s0
′
‖). (39)
Assumption 12 (Monotonicity Condition). There exist β1 and β2 such that ∀t ∈
[0, T ], ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀yL, y˜L ∈ Rd, and ∀s0, s˜0 ∈ R2n+nK , we have (see [39])
[A0(t, ξ0)−A0(t, ξ˜0)].(ξ0−ξ˜0) ≤ −β1‖H0(y
L−y˜L)‖2−β2‖H
T
0 (s
0−s˜0)‖2, (40)
where β1 > 0, β2 ≥ 0.
Finally, the closed-loop dynamics of the major agent A0 when the control
action (28) is substituted in (1) satisfies the SDE
dX0t =
(
A0X
0
t −B0R
−1
0 [N
⊺
0X
0
t + B
⊺
0(Π0(t)X
0
t + s
0
t )] + b0(t)
)
dt+ σ0 dw
0
t .
(41)
4.4 Minor Agent’s Regulation Problem: Infinite Population
For minor agent Ai’s, i ∈ N, we extend the state with the infinite population
common process y¯t, the major agent’s state x
0
t , and the state mean field x¯t to form
the minor agent’s extended stateX it = [(x
i
t)
⊺, (y¯t)
⊺, (x0t )
⊺, (x¯t)
⊺]⊺ which satisfies
dX it =
(
AkX
i
t + Bkui +M
k
t
)
dt+ Σk dW
i
t . (42)
To attain the extended matrices in (42), the joint dynamics of (i) minor agentAi’s
system given by (2), (ii) the common process y¯t given by (21) where (9) and (28)
are substituted , (iii) the major agent A0’s closed loop system given by (41), and
(iv) the state mean field x¯t given by (12) are utilized which results in
Ak =
[
Ak 0n×(2n+nK)
0(2n+nK)×n A0 − B0R
−1
0 N
⊺
0 − B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0Π0
]
, Bk =
[
Bk
0(2n+nK)×m
]
,
(43)
Mkt =
[
bk(t)
M0t − B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0s0(t)
]
, Σk =
[
σk 0n×(2r+rK)
0(2n+nK)×r Σ0
]
, W it =
[
wit,
W 0t
]
.
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Next, the minor agent Ai’s extended cost functional is formed as
Jexi (u
i) =
1
2
E
[
X
i⊺
T GkX
i
T +
∫ T
0
{
X i⊺s QkX
i
s+2X
i⊺
s Nku
i
s+u
i⊺
s Rku
i
s
}
ds
]
, (44)
where the corresponding weight matrices are given by
Gk =
[
I2n, 02n×(n+nK)
]⊺
Gk
[
I2n, 02n×(n+nK)
]
,
Qk =
[
I2n, 02n×(n+nK)
]⊺
Qk
[
I2n, 02n×(n+nK)
]
,
Nk =
[
Nk
0(n+nK)×m
]
. (45)
The dynamics (42) together with the cost functional (44) constitute a stochastic
optimal control problem for minor agent Ai, i ∈ N, in the infinite population
limit. Once again, according to Theorem 3, the minor agent Ai’s optimal control
action for the infinite population case is given by
u
i,∗
t = −R
−1
k
[
N
⊺
kX
i
t + B
⊺
k
(
Πk(t)X
i
t + s
i,k
t
)]
, (46)
where {Πk(t), k ∈ K}, is the solutions to the following coupled deterministic
Riccati equation
−Π˙k = ΠkAk + A
⊺
kΠk − (B
⊺
kΠk + N
⊺
k)
⊺R−1k (B
⊺
kΠk + N
⊺
k) +Qk, (47a)
Πk(T ) = Gk, (47b)
and s
i,k
t , k ∈ K, is the solution to the following FBSDE
ds
i,k
t = −
([
(Ak − BkR
−1
k Nk)
⊺ − ΠkBkR
−1
k B
⊺
k
]
s
i,k
t +ΠkM
k
t
)
dt+ (qit − ΠkΣk)dW
i
t ,
(48a)
s
i,k
T = 0,
(48b)
where Mkt is generated through forward propagation, and q
i
t is an F
i,r-adapted
process defined under equation (97). The complete derivation of (47)-(48) will be
discussed in Section 4.5.
We use the notation
g
i,k
t = g
i,k(yLt , s
i
t) = [(Ak − BkR
−1
k Nk)
⊺ −ΠkBkR
−1
k B
⊺
k]s
i
t +ΠkM
k
t , (49)
ξit = [y
L
t , s
i
t]
⊺, (50)
Ai,k(t, ξi) =
[
−H⊺kg
i,k
Hkfˆ
]
(t, yL, si), (51)
for a fixed (3n+ nK)× n full-rank matrixHk.
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Assumption 13 (Measurability Condition). The processes fˆt and g
0
t are,
respectively, Rn-valued and R3n+nK-valued progressively measurable processes
on [0, T ] such that (see [39])
E
[∫ T
0
‖fˆt‖
2 dt
]
<∞, (52)
E
[∫ T
0
‖gi,kt ‖
2 dt
]
<∞. (53)
Assumption 14 (Growth Condition). There exists a constant c > 0 such that for
each (t, ω, yL, si) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω×Rd×R3n+nK , ∀i ∈ N, and k ∈ K, we have (see
[39])
‖fˆ(yL)‖ ≤ c(1 + ‖yL‖), (54)
‖gi,k(yL, si)‖ ≤ c(1 + ‖yL‖+ ‖si‖). (55)
Assumption 15 (Lipschitz Condition). There exists a constant c > 0 such that
∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀yL, yL
′
∈ Rd, ∀si, si
′
∈ R3n+nK , ∀i ∈ N, and k ∈ K, we
have (see [39])
‖fˆ(yL)− fˆ(yL
′
)‖ ≤ c(1 + ‖yL − yL
′
‖), (56)
‖gi,k(yL, si)− gi,k(yL
′
, si
′
)‖ ≤ c(1 + ‖yL − yL
′
‖+ ‖si − si
′
‖). (57)
Assumption 16 (Monotonicity Condition). There exist β1 and β2 such that ∀t ∈
[0, T ], ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀yL, y˜L ∈ Rd, and ∀si, s˜i ∈ R3n+nK , ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ K We have
(see [39])
[Ai,k(t, ξi)−Ai,k(t, ξ˜i)].(ξi−ξ˜i) ≤ −β1‖Hk(y
L−y˜L)‖2−β2‖H
T
k (s
i−s˜i)‖2, (58)
where β1 > 0, β2 ≥ 0.
Finally, control action (46) is substituted in (2) which gives minor agent Ai’s,
i ∈ N, closed loop system as
dX it =
(
AkX
i
t −BkR
−1
k
[
N
⊺
kX
i
t + B
⊺
k
(
ΠkX
i
t + s
i,k
t
)]
+ bk
)
dt+ σkdw
i
t. (59)
Remark 2. When there are no latent processes, i.e. yLt = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
the diffusion terms of (30) and (48) become zero as we have the deterministic
functions of time q0 and qk given by
q0 = Π0Σ0, (60)
qk = ΠkΣk, (61)
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which for minor agents are specified with respect to their type. Hence equations
(30) and (48) reduce to the deterministic offset equations of classical major-minor
LQG mean field games in [11].
4.5 Nash and ǫ-Nash Equilibria
To derive the mean field consistency equations which specify the matrices in the
control and state mean field equations (9) and (12), respectively, the closed loop
system (59) of minor agent Ai may be written out explicitly as
dxit =
(
Akx
i
t − BkR
−1
k
(
N
⊺
k + B
⊺
kΠk
)[
x
i⊺
t , y¯
⊺
t , x
0⊺
t , x¯
⊺
t
]⊺
−BkR
−1
k B
⊺
ks
i,k
t + bk
)
dt + σk dw
i
t, (62)
where i ∈ N, k ∈ K.
Next, define the block matrices
Πk =

Πk,11 Πk,12 Πk,13 Πk,14
Πk,21 Πk,22 Πk,23 Πk,24
Πk,31 Πk,32 Πk,33 Πk,34
Πk,41 Πk,42 Πk,43 Πk,44
 , Nk =

Nk,1
Nk,2
Nk,3
Nk,4
 , (63)
ek = [0n×n, ..., 0n×n, In, 0n×n, ..., 0n×n] , (64)
where Πk,11, Πk,22, Πk,33 ∈ R
n×n, Πk,44 ∈ R
nK×nK; Nk,1,Nk,2,Nk,3 ∈ R
n×m,
Nk,4 ∈ R
nK×m; and ek ∈ R
n×nK , denotes a matrix which has the identity matrix
In in its kth block and zero matrix 0n×n in other (K−1) remaining blocks, for all
k ∈ K.
Now, taking the average of (62) overNk minor agents of type k ∈ K, and then
its limit as the number Nk of agents within the subpopulation k goes to infinity
(i.e. Nk →∞), we find
dx¯kt =
{[(
Ak −BkR
−1
k (N
⊺
k,1 +B
⊺
kΠk,11)
)
ek −BkR
−1
k (N
⊺
k,4 +B
⊺
kΠk,14)
]
x¯t
−BkR
−1
k (N
⊺
k,3+B
⊺
kΠk,13)x
0
t−BkR
−1
k (N
⊺
k,2+B
⊺
kΠk,12)y¯t+(bk−BkR
−1
k B
⊺
ks¯
k
t )
}
dt, q.m.
(65)
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In (65), s¯kt is obtained by taking the average and then the limit of (48) over the
subpopulation k ∈ K as Nk →∞, and solves
ds¯kt = −
([
(Ak − BkR
−1
k N
⊺
k)
⊺ − ΠkBkR
−1
k B
⊺
k
]
s¯kt +ΠkM
k
t
)
dt+ (q¯t −ΠkΣk)dW¯t,
(66a)
s¯kT = 0,
(66b)
where W¯t =
[
0r×1,
W 0t
]
, since limNk→∞
1
Nk
∑Nk
i=1w
i
t = 0; and q¯t = e
−A⊺
k
tZ¯t, where
Z¯t is an F
0,r
t -adapted process stemming from the martingale representation of M¯t,
which itself is the limiting average
1
N
N∑
i=1
M it
q.m.
−→ M¯t , (67)
whereM it is given by (89).
Then, equating (65) with (12) results in the following sets of equations.
−Π˙0 = Π0A0 + A
⊺
0Π0 − (N
⊺
0 + B
⊺
0Π0)
⊺R−10 (N
⊺
0 + B
⊺
0Π0) +Q0, Π0(T ) = G0,
−Π˙k = ΠkAk + A
⊺
kΠk − (N
⊺
k + B
⊺
kΠk)
⊺R−1k (N
⊺
k + B
⊺
kΠk) +Qk, Πk(T ) = Gk,
C¯k = −R
−1
k (N
⊺
k,1 +B
⊺
kΠk,11)ek − R
−1
k (N
⊺
k,4 +B
⊺
kΠk,14),
D¯k = −R
−1
k (N
⊺
k,3 +B
⊺
kΠk,13),
E¯k = −R
−1
k (N
⊺
k,2 +B
⊺
kΠk,12),
A¯k = Akek +BkC¯k,
G¯k = BkD¯k,
L¯k = BkE¯k,
(68)

ds0t = −
([
(A0 − B0R
−1
0 N
⊺
0)
⊺ −Π0B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0
]
s0t +Π0M
0
t
)
dt+ (q0t −Π0Σ0)dW
0
t , s
0
T = 0,
ds¯kt = −
([
(Ak − BkR
−1
k N
⊺
k)
⊺ − ΠkBkR
−1
k B
⊺
k
]
s¯kt +ΠkM
k
t
)
dt+ (q¯t − ΠkΣk)dW¯t, s¯
k
T = 0,
r¯kt = −R
−1
k B
⊺
ks¯
k
t ,
m¯kt = Bkr¯
k
t + bk.
(69)
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Equations (68)-(69) are called the mean field consistency equations (see [11])
from which the matrices in (9) and (12) can be calculated.
Let us define the following matrix
M1 = diag(Ak −BkR
−1
k (N
⊺
k,1 +B
⊺
kΠk,11))k∈K. (70)
Assumption 17. The matrixM1 is Hurwitz.
The following theorem links the infinite population equilibria to the finite
population case.
Theorem 3. Subject to Assumptions 1-17, the mean field equations (68)-(69)
together with the system equations (1)-(3) and (5)-(6), generate an infinite family
of stochastic control laws U∞,∗MF , with finite sub-families U
N,∗
MF , {u
i,∗
t ; i ∈ N},
1 ≤ N <∞, given by (28)-(30) and (46)-(48), such that
(i) U∞,∗MF yields a unique Nash equilibrium within the set of linear control laws
U∞L such that
J∞i (u
i,∗, u−i,∗) = inf
ui∈U∞
L
J∞i (u
i, u−i,∗), (71)
(ii) All agent systems i ∈ N0, are second order stable in the sense that
sup
t∈[0,T ],i∈N0
E
{
(‖xit‖
2
+ ‖x
(N)
t ‖
2
+ ‖x¯t‖
2 + ‖yt‖
2)
}
< C, (72)
with C independent of N.
(iii) {UNMF ; 1 ≤ N < ∞} yields a unique ǫ-Nash equilibrium within the set of
linear control laws UNL for all ǫ > 0, i.e. for all ǫ > 0, there exists N(ǫ)
such that for all N ≥ N(ǫ)
JNi (u
i,∗, u−i,∗)− ǫ ≤ inf
ui∈UN
L
JNi (u
i, u−i,∗) ≤ JNi (u
i,∗, u−i,∗), (73)
where JNi (u
i,∗, u−i,∗)→ J∞i (u
i,∗, u−i,∗), i ∈ N0, as N →∞.

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Proof. First, we use the convex analysis method developed in [40] to obtain the
best response strategies (17)-(19) and (23)-(25); this proves part (i) of the theorem.
Then, following the same lines as in the closed-loop and asymptotic equilibrium
analysis of [11, Sec. 5 & 6], the agents are second order stable and the set
of infinite population control actions yields an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the large
population system which prove parts (ii) and (iii) of the theorem, respectively.
Part(i): Consider the major agent A0’s extended system. Following the lines
of the proof to Theorem 3.2 in [40], the Gaˆteaux derivative of the major agent’s
extended cost DJex0 (u
0) in the direction of ω0t ∈ U
0 is given by
〈DJex0 (u
0), ω0〉 = E
[ ∫ T
0
ω
0⊺
t
{
N
⊺
0X
0,u
t +R0u
0
t
+ B⊺0
(
e−A
⊺
0
tM0t −
∫ t
0
eA
⊺
0
(s−t)
(
Q0X
0,u
s + N0u
0
s
)
ds
)}
dt
]
, (74)
where the martingale (M0t )t∈[0,T ] is given by
M0t = E
[
eA
⊺
0
TG0X
0,u
T +
∫ T
0
eA
⊺
0
s(Q0X
0,u
s + N0u
0
s)ds
∣∣∣F0,rt ]. (75)
Given that Assumption 7 holds, following the lines of the proof to Theorem 3.3
in [40], the major agent A0’s optimal control action u
0,∗
t in the infinite population
limit is
u
0,∗
t = −R
−1
0
[
N
⊺
0X
0,∗
t +B
⊺
0
(
e−A
⊺
0
tM0t −
∫ t
0
eA
⊺
0
(s−t)
(
Q0X
0,∗
s +N0u
0,∗
s
)
ds
)]
, (76)
which is obtained by setting (74) to zero for all possible paths of ω0t ∈ U
0.
Next, define
p0t := e
−A⊺
0
tM0t −
∫ t
0
eA
⊺
0
(s−t)
(
Q0X
0,∗
s + N0u
0,∗
s
)
ds, (77)
which is the adjoint process for the major agent’s system in the stochastic
maximum principle framework. Next, we adopt the ansatz
p0t = Π0(t)X
0,∗
t + s
0
t , (78)
whose substitution in (76) yields a linear state feedback form for the major agent’s
optimal control action, i.e.
u
0,∗
t = −R
−1
0
[
N
⊺
0X
0,∗
t + B
⊺
0
(
Π0(t)X
0,∗
t + s
0
t )
)]
. (79)
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To determine Π0(t) ∈ R
(2+K)n×(2+K)n and s0t ∈ R
(2+K)n, first both sides of (78)
are differentiated and then (22) and (79) are substituted, which gives
dp0t =
[(
Π˙0 +Π0A0 −Π0B0R
−1
0 N
⊺
0 − Π0B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0Π0
)
X0t dt
+
(
−Π0B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0s
0
t +Π0M
0
t
)
dt+ ds0t
]
+Π0Σ0(t)dW
0
t . (80)
Next, both sides of (77) are differentiated to yield
dp0t = (−A
⊺
0p
0
t −Q0X
0
t − N0u
0
t )dt+ e
−A⊺
0
tdM0t . (81)
The martingale representation theorem implies thatM0t can be written as
M0t = M
0
0 +
∫ t
0
Z0sdW
0
s , (82)
where Z0t is an F
0,r-adapted process. Then, (79) and (82) are substituted in (81)
which implies
dp0t =
[
(−Q0 + N0R
−1
0 N
⊺
0 + N0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0Π0 − A
⊺
0Π0)X
0,∗
t
+ (N0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0 − A
⊺
0)s
0
t
]
dt + q0t dW
0
t , (83)
where q0t = e
−A⊺
0
tZ0t .
Finally, (80) and (83) are equated which results in the deterministic Riccati
equation
Π˙0 +Π0A0 + A
⊺
0Π0 − (B
⊺
0Π0 + N
⊺
0)
⊺R−10 (B
⊺
0Π0 + N
⊺
0) +Q0 = 0, (84)
Π0(T ) = G0, (85)
and the stochastic offset equation
ds0t +
([
(A0 − B0R
−1
0 N
⊺
0)
⊺ − Π0B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0
]
s0t +Π0M
0
t
)
dt+ (Π0Σ0 − q
0
t )dW
0
t = 0,
(86)
s0T = 0.
(87)
To derive the optimal control action for minor agent Ai, i ∈ N, as well as
the corresponding Riccati and offset equations, a similar approach is followed.
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Following the lines of the proof to Theorem 3.2 in [40], the Gaˆteaux derivative of
the extended cost functionalDJexk (u
i), k ∈ K, for minor agentAi, i ∈ N, is given
by
〈DJexk (u
i), ωi〉 = E
[ ∫ T
0
(ωit)
⊺
{
N
⊺
kX
i,u
t +Rku
i
t
+ B⊺k
(
e−A
⊺
k
tM it −
∫ t
0
eA
⊺
k
(s−t)(QkX
i,u
s + Nku
i
s)ds
)}
dt
]
. (88)
where the martingale (M it )t∈[0,T ] is given by
M it := E
[
eA
⊺
k
TGkX
i,u
T +
∫ T
0
eA
⊺
k
s(QkX
i,u
s + Nku
i
s)ds
) ∣∣∣F i,rt ]. (89)
Given Assumption 8, following the lines of the proof to Theorem 3.3 in [40],
the optimal control action u
i,∗
t for minor agent Ai in the infinite population limit
is
u
i,∗
t = −R
−1
k
[
N
⊺
kX
i,∗
t +B
⊺
k
(
e−A
⊺
k
tM it −
∫ t
0
eA
⊺
k
(s−t)(QkX
i,∗
s +Nku
i,∗
s )ds
)]
, (90)
which is obtained by setting (88) to zero for all possible paths of ωit ∈ U
i.
Next, define pit as
pit = e
−A⊺
k
tM it −
∫ t
0
eA
⊺
0
(s−t)(QkX
i,∗
s + Nku
i,∗
s )ds, (91)
which corresponds to the adjoint process for the minor agent Ai’s system in the
stochastic maximum principle framework. Then adopting the ansatz
pit = Πk(t)X
i,∗
t + s
i,k
t , (92)
and substituting into (90) results in a linear state feedback form for u
i,∗
t as
u
i,∗
t = −R
−1
k
[
N
⊺
kX
i,∗
t + B
⊺
k
(
Πk(t)X
i,∗
t + s
i,k
t
)]
. (93)
To obtain Πk(t) ∈ R
(3+K)n×(3+K)n and s
i,k
t ∈ R
(3+K)n, first both sides of (92) are
differentiated and then (42) and (46) are substituted which yields
dpit =
[(
Π˙k +ΠkAk −ΠkBkR
−1
k N
⊺
k − ΠkBkR
−1
k B
⊺
kΠk
)
X
i,∗
t
− ΠkBkR
−1
k B
⊺
ks
i,k
t +ΠkM
k
t + ds
i,k
t
]
dt+ΠkΣk(t)dW
i
t . (94)
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Next, both sides of (91) are differentiated yielding
dpit = (−A
⊺
kp
i
t −QkX
i,∗
t − N
⊺
ku
i,∗
t )dt+ e
−A⊺
k
tdM it . (95)
According to the martingale representation theorem, the martingaleM it admits the
representation
M it = M
i
0 +
∫ t
0
Z isdW
i
s , (96)
where Z it is an F
i,r-adapted process.
Then, (46) and (96) are substituted in (95) which gives
dpit =
[
(−Qk + NkR
−1
k N
⊺
k + NkR
−1
k B
⊺
kΠk − A
⊺
kΠk)X
i,∗
t
+ (NkR
−1
k B
⊺
k − A
⊺
k)s
i,k
t
]
dt+ qitdW
i
t , (97)
where qit = e
−A⊺
k
tZ it . Finally, (94) is equated with (97) which yields
Π˙k +ΠkAk + A
⊺
kΠk − (B
⊺
kΠk + N
⊺
k)
⊺R−1k (B
⊺
kΠk + N
⊺
k) +Qk = 0, (98)
Πk(T ) = Gk, (99)
ds
i,k
t +
([
(Ak − BkR
−1
k N
⊺
k)
⊺ − ΠkBkR
−1
k B
⊺
k
]
s
i,k
t +ΠkM
k
t
)
dt+ (ΠkΣk − q
i
t)dW
i
t = 0,
(100)
s
i,k
T = 0,
(101)
i ∈ N, k ∈ K.
Part (ii) & (iii): Following the closed-loop and asymptotic equilibrium
analysis of [11, Sec. 5 & 6], the set of control actions UN,∗MF , {u
i,∗
t ; i ∈ N},
1 ≤ N <∞, yields second order stability and an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the large
population system given by (1)-(3) and (5)-(6).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced and formulated a new class of major-minor MFG
systems motivated from financial and economic systems, such as those appearing
in algorithmic trading and energy makets. In this novel setup, the major agent
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and each of the mass of minor agents interact with a common process, and this
process also affects their cost functionals. The common process is influenced by
(i) a latent process which is not observed, (ii) a common Wiener process, (iii) the
major agent’s state and control action, and (iv) the average state and control action
of all minor agents. Then, we developed a convex analysis method to establish
the best trading strategies for all agents which yield an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Our
framework can be easily extended to the case where each agent’s dynamics are
also influenced by the common process.
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